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The development of what has come to be thought of as Southeast Asia has been 
profoundly shaped by its interaction with other, more powerful, forces from outside 
the region. Whether this has been the impact of religious traditions from other parts of 
Asia, the impact of expanding economic relations within Asia itself, or the more 
recent and revolutionary impact of ‘the West’ (Beeson 2001a), the contemporary 
nature of the Southeast Asian region is in large part a consequence of influences from 
outside the region itself. As earlier chapters in this volume have demonstrated, in the 
last two hundred years or so European powers, and more recently the United States, 
have had a major impact on Southeast Asia’s development (see McCloud 1995). This 
pattern of regional susceptibility to external influences and power shows no sign of 
abating.  
 
This chapter extends the analysis of Southeast Asia’s interaction with other regional 
and global powers developed in other chapters of this volume by considering the 
countries that have the greatest potential to influence the region’s future development: 
the United States, Japan and China. All of these countries have the capacity – and to 
varying extents, the desire – to influence the overall regional context in which the 
individual members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations 
are embedded. An examination of Southeast Asia’s relations with these three pivotally 
important regional and – in the case of the US – global powers, not only tells us much 
about the distinctive nature of individual bilateral relations between the US, China, 
Japan and the ASEAN membership, but also illuminates the emerging hegemonic 
contestation for regional leadership amongst the major powers themselves. The 
analysis proceeds by considering the basis of the relationship between the major 
powers and the region, before considering what implications major power rivalry may 
have for Southeast Asia’s future development. 
 
The United States and Southeast Asia 
 
The United States is a country like no other. This may be a truism that could be 
applied to any nation, but it is important to emphasise at the outset that the US 
occupies a unique, historically unparalleled place in the contemporary international 
system. In the aftermath of World War II the US emerged as one of only two 
‘superpowers’ with the capacity to influence events in any part of the globe (see 
Berger, this volume). The subsequent demise of the Soviet Union as a strategic rival, 
and the apparent exhaustion of central planning as an alternative to free market 
capitalism, has further reinforced the dominant position of the US (Buzan and Little 
1999). In order to understand just how powerful the US is and why it is able to exert 
such a major influence on the future developmental prospects of the ASEAN states, it 
is necessary to say something about the nature of American power and its historical 
role in the region. 
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The basis of American power 
 
Clearly, the US is the most powerful nation on earth, but what is the basis of its 
power? Why is it that the US can even influence the behaviour of other, apparently 
powerful, states like China and Japan, to say nothing of the less influential nations of 
Southeast Asia? To answer these questions, we need a conceptual framework that will 
identify the constitutive elements of American power in ways that allow comparison 
with both potential rivals, and with countries like those of Southeast Asia, which 
plainly do not always have the capacity to definitively influence events within their 
own borders, let alone in the international system of which they are a part. 
 
Susan Strange (1988) suggests that there are four key components that determine 
which countries are powerful in the international system. What she described as 
‘structural power’ stems from control over security, production, credit, and 
knowledge. At the level of security, or the traditional arena of international rivalry 
that focuses on military and strategic interaction, the US enjoys an unprecedented 
dominance over all other nations. Not only does the US spend far more on defence 
than any other nation at a remarkably small percentage of overall GDP (Brooks and 
Wohlforth 2002), but its position has been reinforced by the ‘revolution in military 
affairs’ (see Dibb 1997-98), in which technological excellence has became an 
increasingly important component of military superiority (Nye and Owens 1996). But 
it is not simply the intimidating technical effectiveness of America’s military 
hardware that accounts for its position at the heart of the world’s security architecture. 
On the contrary, in the East Asia in particular, the US presence has been seen by 
much of the region as pivotal to maintaining a stable balance of power, something that 
explains the continuing presence of American forces in the region at surprisingly little 
cost to itself (Tow 2001: 168). 
 
However, recent events have introduced new fault lines within the region and created 
new points of resistance and opposition to American dominance. At the broader level 
of the East Asian region, China has expressed the strongest reservations about what it 
sees as the US’s increasingly assertive, unilateral and hegemonic ambitions in the 
wake of September 11.1 In Southeast Asia, too, American policy has created major 
tensions and outright resentment. Most prominent here has been Malaysia which, after 
a brief rapprochement when it seemed the authoritarian regime was well placed to 
crack down on Islamic militants, Malaysia has again become the most prominent 
Southeast Asian critic of American policy. It is also important to note that even those 
countries that have not been as outspoken or critical about American policy are also 
struggling to come to terms with its complex strategic and even economic impact 
(Asiatimes.com, March 28, 2003). In Indonesia and the Philippines, American policy 
has fuelled volatile domestic debates about the status of Islam and about national 
independence that have made life difficult for indigenous political elites 
(Asiatimes.com, March 27, 2003, see also Fealy, this volume). 
 
As far as the political-economy of production and credit is concerned, America’s 
position is complex, somewhat contradictory, but – absent an unforseen global market 
meltdown – essentially unassailable. Not only has American economic power 
generally enjoyed something of a renaissance, especially compared to East Asia, and 
thus helping to consolidate America’s overall influence (Cox 2001; Mastanundo, 
2000), but even America’s position as the world’s largest debtor nation has failed to 
 
 
179
undermine its overall economic position. Given the unfavourable attention that has 
been paid to the indebtedness of countries like Indonesia (Beeson 1998), there is no 
small irony in the fact that America has been virtually immune to such criticisms – 
although the massive budget deficits that have emerged as a consequence of the ‘war 
on terror’ and tax cuts for America’s wealthy may change that and place a 
fundamental constraint on even American power (Economist February 8, 2003). 
Nevertheless, there is no comparison in the general strength, diversity and scale of the 
two economies, but to understand why America is able to act in ways that other 
countries cannot, it is necessary to recognise the central position it plays in the 
overall, increasingly integrated global economy.  
 
The US’s role as the principal architect and economic mainstay of the post-war 
Bretton Woods order meant that it occupied a unique position in international affairs 
(Eichengreeen and Kenen 1994). The American dollar was – and to a lesser extent, 
still is – the world’s reserve currency, giving it monetary privileges unavailable to 
other states.2 In addition, American markets allowed the countries of East Asia in 
particular to embark on successful export-led industrialisation, something which, 
despite the resentment America’s expanding Asian trade deficits has caused in parts 
of the US, has entrenched America’s central economic role and overall political 
influence (Robinson 1996). Finally, America’s vision for a new international 
economic order became the ideological blueprint for an emerging global order. That 
this vision was incompletely realised in an East Asian region that frequently preferred 
neo-mercantilist development strategies to the neoliberal orthodoxy championed by 
the US, should not obscure the fact this final element of Strange’s structural power – 
knowledge – is a crucially important ideational component of America’s power and 
influence that remains at the centre of continuing debates about the most appropriate 
policy for post-crisis East and Southeast Asia (Ruggie 1997; Cumings 1999; Agnew 
2001).  
 
It is important to recognise that America’s ability to promote its preferred economic 
model in Southeast Asia has been enhanced by both the relative economic decline of 
Japan, and by the growing importance of US investment in East Asia generally and 
Southeast Asia in particular. As a proportion of the overall foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in East Asia, American FDI increased everywhere except China and Korea. 
When added to the Southeast Asian countries general dependence on US markets for 
the export of electrical goods in particular, the US’s structural power and potential 
leverage over the region has been considerably enhanced (Hsiao et al 2003). The only 
area that Japan retains a significant advantage over US-based economic entities is in 
bank lending – but given the negative role played by Japanese banks in the Asian 
economic crisis, when their own domestic problems were exported to the rest of the 
region, this is no longer a major advantage (Bevacqua 1998). 
 
It is also noteworthy that the US has moved to reinforce this latent economic 
advantage through a series of bilateral trade agreements. At one level this reflects a 
long-standing scepticism on the part of many American policymakers about the merits 
of multilateral institutions like the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
forum, and its failure to secure trade liberalisation in East Asia (Dent 2003). At 
another level, however, this new predilection for bilateralism reflects a desire on the 
part of the US to use its power more directly to open up markets and achieve the sorts 
of outcomes that provided elusive under APEC. As far as Southeast Asia’s collective 
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regional identity is concerned, the establishment of preferential bilateral trade 
agreements between the likes of Singapore and the US inevitably undermines the 
collective identity of Southeast Asia as a coherent actor (Ravenhill 2003). 
 
Taken together, then, America’s relatively unchallenged ascendancy or structural 
power has underpinned its ‘hegemonic’ position in the Asia-Pacific in particular and 
in the international system more generally (Agnew and Corbridge 1995). America’s 
unique position at the centre of the post-war international order means that it has the 
capacity to influence the position of not just the countries of Southeast Asia, but of the 
other major powers of the region as well. This interplay - both bilaterally between the 
US and the ASEAN countries, and between the US, Japan and China – has been and 
will continue to be a significant determinant of development in Southeast Asia 
(Beeson and Berger 2003).  
 
The impact and objectives of American power in Southeast Asia 
 
Initially, as Mark Berger’s chapter in this volume reminds us, America’s principle 
interest in Southeast Asia was strategic. The bi-polar contest with the Soviet Union 
that characterised the Cold War era occurred at a number of levels – economic, 
ideological, and military – and had the effect of fracturing the larger East Asian 
region. Even where Cold War contestation was ultimately instrumental in 
encouraging the development of the ASEAN organisation and consequently 
enhancing regional cooperation, it occurred within the overarching framework of 
bilateral alliances between the US and its allies in the region (Cummings 1997). In 
other words, American power has had a complex, simultaneously integrative and 
disintegrative impact on the region. While the Cold War persisted a number of 
Southeast Asian nations, especially Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia either directly 
or indirectly benefited from the increased aid and investment flows that resulted from 
the wars in Korea and Vietnam (Stubbs 1999). Indeed, it should also be emphasised 
that Japan was seen as the lynchpin of the emergent capitalist order in East Asia and 
urged to play a more expansive economic role in Southeast Asia as a consequence. 
For those parts of Southeast Asia fortunate enough to be not directly or indirectly in 
conflict with the US, the Cold War generally and the Vietnam War in particular were 
no bad thing. For Vietnam and Indochina, the experience was immediately 
devastating and added immeasurably to their respective longer-term developmental 
problems. 
 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, with the prospects of international conflict 
involving the major powers looking remote, and with a generalised and seemingly 
sustainable, shift from the geo-strategic to the geo-economic (Luttwak 1990), the 
region’s prospects looked bright. However, the potential implications of a 
concomitant change in the foreign policy priorities of the world’s only super-power 
were clearly revealed in the management and aftermath of the East Asian crisis that 
began in 1997, and which had an especially severe impact on Southeast Asia (Winters 
2000; Haggard 2000) The US played a prominent role in attempts to manage the 
crisis, exploiting its institutional influence over, and links with, key agencies like the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Wade 2001). In this manner 
it was able to exploit the opportunities the crisis offered to try and break open hitherto 
relatively closed Asian markets and attempt to systematically reconstitute the political 
economies of countries like Indonesia and Thailand in ways that suited its normative 
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preferences and economic interests. Such efforts may not have been entirely 
successful - even counterproductive, perhaps – having generated a good deal of 
resentment at the local level (Hewison 2001), and even producing a retrospective 
acknowledgement by the IMF that it may have made things worse (Fischer 2001).  
 
Nevertheless, the US’s role in the crisis and its aftermath served as a graphic reminder 
of the disparities of power that exist between the region and America, and the latter’s 
continuing importance at a number of levels. A subsequent downturn in the US 
economy demonstrated Southeast Asia’s continuing structural dependence on, and 
vulnerability to, changes in North American markets; even economically sophisticated 
Singapore was plunged into recession (Beeson 2001a). The continuing vulnerability 
of Southeast Asia to wider shifts in American sentiments was further highlighted by a 
crisis of a different sort as the tragic events of ‘September 11th’ demonstrated that the 
US retained the capacity to shape events in the region across the region at a number of 
levels. The US’s insistence that other nations must declare themselves for or against 
its self-declared ‘war on terrorism’ meant that the less powerful states of the region 
had little choice but to accommodate US preferences or risk retribution. Once again, 
however, the spectre of conflict, albeit generally low-level or potential, generated a 
complex mix of costs and benefits across the region. As noted earlier, Malaysia – 
initially at least – was able to rebuild relations with the US by positioning itself as a 
bulwark against radical Islam, although this relationship has subsequently deteriorated 
and Mahathir has assumed his customary role as a key critic of the US in particular 
and ‘the West’ more generally (Australian Financial Review March 25, 2003). 
Although the Philippines obtained direct economic and military assistance in its 
perennial struggle with insurrectionary movements it has been at the cost of 
fermenting divisive domestic debates about relations with the US. The position of 
Indonesia’s political elites is even more problematic: because it is seen as providing a 
supportive environment for international terrorism, it has come under pressure from 
the US to clamp down on more radical elements of its substantially Muslim 
population – something that has further fuelled anti-Americanism in much of 
Indonesia (Australian Financial Review April 2, 2003). 
 
The general point to emphasise about American power in the context of Southeast 
Asia is that it has resources available to it at the strategic, economic, and institutional 
levels that allow it to pursue its interests in ways that other countries cannot. This is 
not to suggest that the US always has a clear, coherent and enduring notion of 
precisely what its ‘national interests’ are. On the contrary, American foreign policy is 
the product of multiple influences and demonstrates revealing differences and 
conflicts across various issues areas (Trubowitz 1998). However, and despite these 
important caveats, the US remains a much more effective and powerful international 
actor than either of its potential hegemonic rivals in East Asia. 
 
Japan and Southeast Asia 
 
The fact that Japan is both the world’s second largest economy and an actual part of 
the larger East Asian region should mean it is perfectly placed to exert a powerful 
influence on regional affairs generally and over its smaller Southeast Asian 
neighbours in particular. While its sheer economic weight has meant that Japan has 
inevitably influenced what is becoming an increasingly integrated regional economy, 
it has demonstrated nothing like the same capacity or willingness to exercise a similar 
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influence in the political realm. For all its potential advantages and importance, Japan 
has only been able to exercise what I have described elsewhere as a form of ‘quasi-
hegemony’ (Beeson 2001b). To see why, and to understand the implications that flow 
from this for the region more generally, we need to explore the distinctive historical 
forces that have shaped Japan’s regional presence.  
 
Japan’s regional role in context 
 
There is no doubt that Japan has had a major impact on Southeast Asia. Whether this 
has been positive or negative is a more contentious issue. One of the keys to 
unravelling Japan’s often-contradictory relationship with the region is to place it in 
historical context. In this regard one of the most important periods in shaping not only 
Japan’s relationship with Southeast Asia, but also its relationship with the US, was the 
period leading up to and including World War II.  
 
A number of major consequences of Japan’s war-time experiences, which have in 
large part determined its post-war foreign policies, merit particular emphasis. First, 
Japan’s wartime expansion into parts of East and Southeast Asia may have been 
frequently brutal and traumatic, but it did play a crucial part in destroying the myth of 
European superiority, and hastening the actual withdrawal of the European powers as 
a consequence (Yahuda 1996). Moreover, Japan’s occupation of Southeast Asia 
accelerated the independence process in countries like Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Vietnam, and established the idea that Asian powers could not only assume a more 
prominent and successful place on the world stage, but might also unite together as 
Asians. For all the self-serving rhetoric that accompanied Japan’s proposed ‘Asian 
Co-Prosperity Sphere’, it did mark the beginnings of the sort of pan-Asianism that 
continues to play a part in contemporary political practices across the region. 
 
A second major consequence of Japan’s wartime activities flowed from its military 
defeat by the US, something that subsequently influenced the style and objectives of 
Japanese foreign and economic policy. The repudiation of military adventurism, 
combined with the US’s direct role in constructing Japan’s new post-war ‘peace 
constitution’, has had the effect of making Japan a negligible military force in post-
war East Asia. This is not to suggest that Japan does not now have a formidable 
military capacity by the standards of the region. On the contrary, it does (Pyle 1998). 
But for all its military potential, Japan has shown a remarkable lack of enthusiasm 
about actually utilising it, other than in a ‘self defence’ capacity. Japan’s continuing 
strategic reliance on, not to say subordination to the US, has simultaneously 
eliminated a potentially crucial component of Japanese hegemony whilst reinforcing 
America’s. Significantly, and despite widespread opposition, the Japanese 
government has offered broad support for American policy (Asiatimes.com, March 
29, 2003), a policy that inevitably constrains Japan’s potential for independent 
regional leadership. 
 
Such a policy has not been without its advantages, however. The third major effect of 
Japan’s low military and foreign policy profile has been a systematic privileging of 
economic development. Japan’s relentless post-war economic reconstruction and 
expansion, its initial preoccupation with domestic development, and its consistently 
mercantilist approach to international economic relations, marked it out as a new sort 
of ‘trading state’ (Rosecrance 1986; Heginbotham and Samuels 1998). The 
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remarkable success of this strategy, and the apparent efficacy of the collaborative 
relations between government and business that underpinned it, gave Japan a certain 
cachet as an exemplar of successful industrialisation and development within Asia. 
While the same degree of autonomous state capacity that characterised Japan’s 
development may not have been generally present in Southeast Asia, a number of 
countries attempted to adopt aspects of the Japanese model in an effort to reproduce 
the Japan’s rapid industrialisation.3 
 
Japan’s contemporary relations with the region 
 
While Japan’s contemporary economic problems may have undermined both its 
primacy as a potential economic role model and its actual importance as a regional 
economic actor, it is important to recognise that for much of the post-war period 
Japan was the cornerstone of regional economic development and integration. Japan’s 
economic relations with Southeast Asia have deepened and become more extensive, 
mirroring Japan’s own economic development. As the Japanese economy expanded 
and became more sophisticated, a three way trade developed between Japan, 
Southeast Asia and the US, in which Japan played a crucial intermediary role, initially 
(until the mid 1960s) as an importer of industrial goods from the US, and as an 
exporter of simple manufactures to Southeast Asia. Subsequently, as economic 
development in Japan gathered pace, it became a crucial source of investment capital 
for much of Southeast Asia as the countries of the region sought to accelerate their 
own industrialisation processes. This mutually beneficial relationship was encouraged 
by the Japanese government, which wanted export labour intensive industries and 
upgrade Japan’s domestic industrial base. Following the Plaza Accord in 1985, which 
saw a major appreciation in the value of the yen, and the subsequent development of 
Japan’s ‘bubble economy’ in the late 1980s, a massive new wave of Japanese 
investment in the region occurred which entrenched Japan’s position at the centre of 
an emergent regional production structure (Beeson 2001b; Gangopadhyay 1998). 
 
A couple of important caveats should be added to this seemingly benign picture of a 
mutually beneficial symbiosis between Japan and Southeast Asia, however. First, 
Japanese corporations and their subsidiaries have generally been the principal target 
of Japanese government assistance designed to promote the regional expansion of 
Japanese business. The complex packages of assistance and foreign aid packages 
offered by the Japanese government have not only primarily benefited Japanese 
business (Arase 1994), but they have also had the effect of locking other countries 
into subordinate positions in region-wide production networks (Hatch and Yamamura 
1996). These sorts of initiatives are, despite Japan’s own economic difficulties, still in 
place and remain part of Japan’s longer-term efforts to integrate itself into the region 
through the provision of technical assistance and the promotion of the ‘Japanese way’ 
of doing business (Hook 2002: 28). However, and this is the second point to make, 
Japanese companies have traditionally been loathe to transfer technology to other 
countries, making it difficult for other regional economies to follow in Japan’s 
footsteps (Bernard and Ravenhill 1995). And yet the very nature of contemporary 
production processes, especially in the electronics industries, appears to be forcing 
Japanese companies to open up their production structures and transfer technology in 
response to the more competitive strategies of their American rivals (Ernst 2000).  
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Despite the decline in the competitive position of both the Japanese economy and of a 
number of Japanese corporations (Porter et al 2000; Katz 1998), Japan’s accumulated 
economic weight means that it will continue to play a key role in the region. Indeed, 
the possibility exists that Japan could actually play a major leadership role in the 
emergent regional political architecture that has gained pace and prominence in the 
wake of the Asian crisis. Although Japan has often found it difficult to develop an 
independent, coherent and consistent foreign policy, in the aftermath of the crisis 
Japan was at the forefront of proposals to develop regionally based financial 
mechanisms to manage any future crises. While Japan’s proposal for an Asian 
Monetary Fund and the so-called Miyazawa Initiative failed to develop much 
momentum in the face of initial US hostility, the subsequent Chiang Mai Initiative, 
which agreed to form a network of currency swap arrangements as part of the larger 
ASEAN + 3 grouping, indicates that there is still life in the general project of regional 
financial integration and that Japan continues to play a prominent role in promoting it 
(see Stubbs, this volume; Kawai et al, 2001: 46).  
 
It remains to be seen, of course, just how far the ASEAN + 3 initiative will develop, 
and just how successfully it can overcome lingering animosities between Japan and 
Southeast Asia, and - even more pointedly - between Japan and China. However, the 
basis for greater financial integration exists, and in the wake of the devastating impact 
of the crisis and the intrusive role played by the US and the IMF, there is a significant 
amount of political support for such an initiative. Significantly, in the three way 
contest for regional influence between the US, Japan and China, both of the latter 
could benefit from being ‘insiders’ at a moment of institutional consolidation within 
the larger East Asian region, which is occurring, suggests one observer, ‘in opposition 
to the West in general and the US in particular’ (Webber 2001: 364). As we shall see, 
even China has become a less threatening force as a consequence of recent events and 
the continuing reconfiguration of regional relations. 
 
China and Southeast Asia 
 
Like Japan, China looms large in the thinking of Southeast Asian policymakers. 
Unlike Japan, however, China’s relationship with the region has been further 
complicated by ideological and strategic concerns that have made it, especially during 
the Cold War period, a more direct threat to the ASEAN nations in particular. Yet 
somewhat paradoxically, even after the Cold War, when China is actively seeking to 
integrate itself into an increasingly global capitalist economy, the ‘China threat’ has 
not entirely diminished; concerns about China’s long-term hegemonic ambitions in 
the region have, to some extent, given way to a more immediate concerns about its 
potential as an economic rival to a Southeast Asian region still coming to terms with 
the aftermath of economic crisis. Again, making sense of these contradictory 
pressures necessitates placing China’s relations with the region in historical context. 
 
The China threat in context 
 
All three of the major powers’ relations have been shaped by historical forces, but in 
China’s case, the legacy of history is a palpable, often self-consciously invoked 
influence on contemporary behaviour. Whether it is the humiliating and traumatic 
impact that nineteenth century European expansion had on China, or the difficulty of 
reconciling its more recent communist traditions with the demands of an increasingly 
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pervasive market capitalism, China’s leaders are constrained by complex, intersecting 
ideological and nationalistic imperatives that have few parallels elsewhere (Wong 
1997). From the perspective of China’s relations with the wider world generally and 
Southeast Asia in particular, what is of most significance is that until the end of the 
Cold War China was preoccupied with internal development and relations with the 
two superpowers -the US and the Soviet Union. It is only since the end of the Cold 
War that China has begun to develop a distinctive regional policy. 
 
Part of China’s introspection can be explained by its pivotal position in Asia before 
European colonisation. As Yahuda (1996: 188) argues, China’s position as East 
Asia’s key continental power allowed it to dominate the region with scant concern for 
developments elsewhere; only now is it reorienting itself toward the maritime Asia-
Pacific region. China’s tempestuous twentieth century history, replete as it was with 
civil war, Japanese invasion, and the Cold War – to say nothing of the formidable 
challenge of national reconstruction - did little to encourage the development of 
cordial relations with its neighbours. The prospects for such relations were rendered 
even more remote by the actions of the US and its desire to ‘contain’ China following 
its ‘loss’ to communism (Zhao 1998). As far as the countries of Southeast Asia were 
concerned the three way competition between the US, the Soviet Union and an 
increasingly powerful China, was a spur to greater cooperation amongst themselves. 
The ASEAN organisation emerged as a direct consequence of inter-state competition 
amongst the major powers, and represented an attempt to increase the leverage and 
influence of the smaller states. As far as China in particular was concerned, its 
position as a potential threat and source of instability was reinforced by the presence 
of substantial numbers of ethnic Chinese throughout Southeast Asia, something that 
caused much anxiety in Malaysia and Indonesia in particular (Acharya 2001).4 
 
The fact that China remains – nominally, at least – a ‘communist’ country is not as 
significant as it once was. Indeed, the idea that communism was a unified, 
homogeneous entity bent on a single path of development had been undermined by 
the Sino-Soviet split, which developed through the late 1950s and early 1960s (Knight 
2000). China’s subsequent rapprochement with the US in 1972 consolidated China’s 
rehabilitation into the wider international community. Although US policy has 
subsequently vacillated between containment and engagement (Shambaugh 1996), 
this should not obscure the realty that not only has China steadily become a more 
important and active player in regional affairs, but its integration into an increasingly 
densely connected regional political-economy is having some influence on the way 
China’s political elites conduct relations with the rest of the world (Yahuda 1997). 
The extent, significance, and relevance of this possible change in specific issue areas 
is, however, more contentious. 
 
China’s interaction with Southeast Asia 
 
 Much has been made of China’s re-emergence as a major power in East Asia and of 
the implications this may have for the regional balance of power generally and for 
relations with the US in particular (Goldstein 1997/98). Despite the fact that some 
observers have rightly pointed to the limitations of Chinese economic and military 
power (Segal 1999) – especially compared to the US – there is no doubt that over the 
course of the twenty-first century China will become an increasingly influential actor 
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in the region at a number of levels. As far as Southeast Asia is concerned this has 
major economic and strategic implications. 
 
The fact that China is generally seen as a ‘non-status quo power’, unhappy with the 
current distribution of power in the region, and intent on rectifying what it views as 
non-negotiable issues that are central to its national identity and domestic politics 
makes it a major source of concern for Southeast Asia (but see Johnson 2003). While 
the future status of Taiwan may be the most obvious issue in this regard,5 China’s 
claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands are a continuing source of tension with 
Southeast Asian states generally and for the other regional claimants Malaysia, 
Vietnam, Brunei and the Philippines in particular. Part of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum’s (ARF) agenda, which the ASEAN states have had a prominent role in 
formulating, has plainly been to encourage China to pursue its interests through 
multilateral rather than bilateral mechanisms (Simon 1996; Bellamy, this volume). 
Although this strategy has not yielded dramatic results thus far, such activities, 
especially when combined with more traditional balance of power calculations and 
China’s desire to improve its regional standing at the expense of the US, are having 
some effect. Chinese strategic analysts view a stronger ASEAN grouping as a 
potentially important counter-weight to US hegemony (Wang 1998: 66), something 
that has seen China make significant efforts to improve relations with ASEAN, 
including proposals for a Code of Conduct with which to manage competing 
territorial claims in the South China Sea (Thayer 2001). Significantly, China is 
becoming a much more active player in regional security initiatives, and has exploited 
unease about the ‘war on terror’ in the region to promote a ‘New Security 
Conference’ to enhance peace and stability amongst the ARF’s Asian members (see 
Breckon 2003: 75). 
 
Although the security dimension of China’s relations with the region invariably 
attracts the most attention, China’s economic relationship with Southeast Asia –
especially in the context of the continuing absence of major international conflict in 
the region – will become an increasingly urgent area of concern for regional 
policymakers. Again, the issues are complex and contradictory. The good news for 
Southeast Asia is that China’s own increased integration into the world economy, 
epitomised by its entry into the World Trade Organisation, is binding China more 
closely into a multilaterally organised, rules-based international economic system that 
effectively constrains its behaviour.6 More immediately, China’s direct economic 
links with Southeast Asia are expanding as the region – the crisis notwithstanding –
partly as a consequence of its economically powerful ethnic Chinese populations. As 
such ASEAN is seen as a long-term potential source of capital investment in China 
and a major export market (Wang 1998).  
 
While the ASEAN states may draw some comfort from the idea that China’s 
continuing economic growth and internationalisation may help to modify its 
behaviour in ways that make it a less threatening security presence in the region, it 
remains a major economic challenge. The sheer size of the Chinese economy, its 
capacity to compete in precisely the same markets with products that are produced 
even more cheaply, and – most crucially of all, perhaps – the fact that China has 
attracted an increasingly large proportion of foreign investment flows into the East 
Asian region, make it a formidable long-term competitor for the Southeast Asian 
economies (The Economist August 25, 2001). It is estimated that China’s proposal to 
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establish a free trade area with the ASEAN states might further increase ASEAN 
exports to China by around 15% - but it might also boost Chinese exports to ASEAN 
by over 50% (Asia Times On-Line, November 8, 2001). Clearly, China’s sheer size – 
like Japan before it – make it a neighbour that ASEAN will find it difficult to come to 
terms with. And yet despite these competitive tensions, China has made itself an 
increasingly important part of the region’s economic and political architecture. 
China’s decision not to devalue its own currency at the height of the Asian crisis – an 
action that would have placed even greater pressure on the currencies and competitive 
position of the floundering Asian economies – was deeply appreciated in Southeast 
Asia and helped to consolidate its emergent status as a pivotal and responsible 
regional actor at the expense of the ineffectual Japanese and the intrusive Americans.  
 
In short, China is displaying an increasingly sophisticated ‘grand strategy’ that has a 
growing multilateral component, and which opens up a complex array of threats and 
opportunities for the countries of Southeast Asia (see Goldstein 2001). Both the 
evolution of China’s foreign policy and the capacity for the Southeast Asian states to 
respond effectively to it will depend not just on the bilateral relations between China 
and the regional states, but on the complex interplay between them and the other 
major powers. 
 
Southeast Asia and Major Power Contestation 
 
The Southeast Asian nations, even acting collectively under the aegis of ASEAN, 
cannot definitively shape the region of which they are a part. At best they can seek to 
influence the major powers in ways that further their interests. The key questions for 
the Southeast Asian nations, therefore, are: which of the three major powers is likely 
to exert the greatest influence in the region? Will the capacity of even the major 
powers vary across issue areas? Will intra-regional initiatives and developments 
significantly influence the way both major competitions unfold? How might such 
developments impact on the less powerful states of Southeast Asia? 
 
The first point to make when assessing the relative influence of the US, China and 
Japan on the larger East Asian region in which the ASEAN states are embedded, is 
that the US remains the only country with hegemonic pretensions and an effective 
capacity across the entire spectrum of structural power. Indeed, so dominant has the 
US position become that it has been characterised as ‘unipolar’ (Wohlforth 1999), a 
situation that is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, according to some 
commentators (Zuckerman 1998). While there may be a degree of wishful thinking, 
not to say triumphalism, in some of these observations, the likelihood that effective 
‘balancing’ in opposition to American hegemony will occur in East Asia is rendered 
less likely by the continuing lingering animosities and suspicions that exist between 
the US’s only plausible regional rivals, China and Japan (Bobrow 1999).7 And yet 
such rivalries should not be overstated: historically the East Asian region has been 
characterised by an acceptance of hierarchical relations centred on China which 
engendered a striking degree of stability. As David Kang (2003) points out, therefore, 
we cannot assume either that the East Asian experience will replicate Europe’s, or that 
the region will descend into chaos in the unlikely event of an American withdrawal. 
 
That China in particular is concerned about America’s hegemonic presence in the 
region is hardly in doubt. And yet given its own comparative lack of strategic, 
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economic and - perhaps most significantly – ideational or ‘soft power’, China plainly 
cannot compete with America directly for regional influence (Sheng Lijun 1999). 
From the perspective of the Southeast Asia, however, there are potential benefits to be 
gleaned from China’s increasing willingness to use multilateral channels to cultivate 
influence (Goldstein 2001). Not only does such a stance on China’s part open up 
potential opportunities to play off an aspirant hegemon against an existing one, but it 
helps reduce China’s significance as a military menace. Similarly, the ASEAN states 
may benefit from the continuing rivalry that exists between China and Japan. It was 
significant that Japanese Prime Minister Junchiro Koizumi’s tour of the ASEAN 
region in early 2002, was widely seen as an effort to re-establish Japan’s position in 
the face of China’s free trade initiative and increasingly effective regional diplomacy 
(Financial Times, January 14, 2002). 
 
But there are a number of increasingly important constraints on Japan’s capacity to 
assert itself in the region. Japan’s former strength and greatest claim to regional 
influence – its economy – has become its most debilitating long-term problem. Not 
only is Japan’s economy now often an object of ridicule rather than admiration, but 
the capacity of the Japanese government to garner influence because of its economic 
presence in the region has been reduced as investment and foreign aid have been 
wound back (Asia Times On-Line, January 23rd, 2002). When coupled with Japan’s 
widely noted inability to play a decisive foreign policy role in keeping with its 
economic status, and its immediate, ‘unconditional support’ for American leadership 
in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the US (Asia Times On-Line, October 30, 
2001), the prospects for an era of Japanese hegemonic influence appear remote 
indeed.  
 
With Japan hamstrung by an under-performing economy, a somewhat discredited 
bureaucracy, and a continuing failure of political leadership, and with China 
effectively well down the ‘capitalist road’ and rapidly integrating itself into an 
international order dominated by the US, it might be supposed that the political and 
economic landscape upon which the ASEAN states must operate is clear: Southeast 
Asia has little choice other than to accommodate itself to the realities of an 
international order predicted on continuing American primacy - with all that implies. 
But the path of future development in either North or Southeast Asia is neither 
obvious nor inevitable. Deep-seated, socially embedded and institutionalised 
constraints will ensure that whatever course regional development takes it will be 
powerfully shaped by the legacy of the past (Beeson 2002b). Moreover, there are 
many across the broader East Asian region who remain unenthusiastic about the 
wholesale adoption of liberal markets or political practices. ASEAN’s important role 
in promoting the development of regionally based, exclusively Asian mechanisms 
with which to manage intra-regional relations is a potentially important indicator of 
future trends (see Beeson 2003). As such, it reminds us that even less powerful states 
retain the capacity to influence the development of the international system of which 
they are a part. In an East Asian region divided intra-regional major power rivalries, 
and a degree of ambivalence towards the only remaining extra-regional superpower, 
such opportunities continue to exist for those with the wit to embrace them. 
 
 
                                                 
Endnotes 
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1 Criticism of American policy has been widespread but China has been especially prominent in its 
criticism. See New York Times, March 27, 2003. 
2 ‘Seigniorage’ refers to the privileges that accrue from the expanded international use of a particular 
currency, something that allows the US to ‘live beyond its means’. For a more detailed explanation, see 
Cohen (1998: 123-25). 
3 It is important to note that Japan has provided an important role model for a number of Southeast 
Asian countries, especially Malaysia’s ‘Look East’ policy. See Jomo (1994); Amsden (1995). 
4 There is some debate in the literature about how useful a categorisation the term ‘overseas Chinese’ 
actually is, but at the very least it alerts us to another possible layer of complexity in intra-regional 
relations. See Dirlik (1997); Wai-chung Yeung (2000). 
5 Southeast Asia’s relations with China are further complicated by the fact that Taiwan is a more 
significant source of trade and investment that China is far as the region is concerned – something that 
has come about partly as a result of a deliberate attempt by Taiwanese authorities to increase ties with 
Southeast Asia. See Ho (2001). 
6 It should be noted that ‘globalisation’ is causing major internal debates about the course of reform in 
China itself. Significantly, however, the pro-globalisation forces are in the ascendancy, despite the 
revolutionary implications that economic internationalisation and WTO membership have for China’s 
domestic political economy. See Garrett (2001). 
7 It should be noted that possible ‘balancing’ behaviour has become more likely as a consequence of 
the increasingly unilateral nature of American foreign policy. See The Australian, March 13, 2003. 
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